A more assertive Europe to enhance transatlantic security

The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us many lessons, one of them being the importance of a more assertive role for Europe as a security provider and a reliable defender of the rules-based international order. The pandemic accelerated already existing and worrisome trends—questioning of multilateral institutions, the disengagement of some of our allies, growing vulnerabilities in critical sectors of our defence co-operation. The pandemic also happened at a time when the U.S.—so far, the unquestionable security and power provider—continued to withdraw from many parts of the world due to its increased focus on China, while the rules-based international order came under permanent pressure from many sides. In Europe, these developments have had a catalyst effect, triggering reflections on the need to strengthen our resilience and capacity to act as a security provider, with autonomy in such strategic areas as access to connectivity, digital technologies, critical raw materials, and health-care supplies. In short, Europe realized it needs to be more self-reliant to guarantee the necessary capabilities in the broad field of security and defence. The term that has been used in this context by high-level EU representatives and think tanks is “strategic autonomy.” Of course, this term, which covers all domains of international policy—from climate change to diplomacy, from trade to social standards—raises questions on this side of the Atlantic, especially in security and defence matters: do Europeans want to replace NATO? The answer is obviously “no.” Our efforts do not aim to redefine the transatlantic relationship, but rather to enhance it. It is neither politically desirable nor realistic that EU member states replicate the military capabilities and the political power of NATO. It would be also unreasonable to think that EU member states would fund European duplications for nuclear defence, command and control, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance or strategic airlift capabilities. The collective defence against any military threat will unquestionably remain NATO’s key role, based on its crucial capabilities provided jointly by allies on both sides of the Atlantic. For many years, our transatlantic allies have insisted that the EU boosts its security and defence capabilities to be able to act as a security provider, especially in its geographic neighbourhood, when NATO is not available or does not have the appropriate tool-set to solve a crisis. The key word is thus complementarity between NATO and EU. This complementarity cannot be taken for granted, and does not happen overnight—it must be organized and backed by political will and enhanced military capabilities on the European side. Let us consider the new, overarching strategic priorities of the EU: the Green Deal, the promotion of multilateral partnerships, strategic autonomy, and resilience. These priorities reflect the very broad and comprehensive European understanding of security with a decisive role of resilience at its centre. This resilience is a national responsibility, a result of whole of government measures. But it is the EU that sets standards, co-ordinates and orchestrates solidarity actions among member states, as it happened during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. New European security initiatives should be perceived within an all-encompassing effort and co-operation with partners. They were launched to improve European military capabilities, which will of course benefit NATO because we all have only one single set of armed forces and no duplication can be allowed. Despite the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, which absorbs a lot of efforts, the EU security initiatives are on track and expanding. First among them is the Permanent Structured Co-operation, or PESCO, one of the pillars of the EU’s defence policy. PESCO allows for co-operation among EU member states to create and develop defence capabilities, invest in shared projects, and enhance the operational readiness and contribution of their armed forces. This initiative has recently been expanded to include participation from third countries. Under this latest development, trusted partners such as Canada are invited to identify and join specific PESCO projects. Another initiative, known as Military Mobility, enables allied military forces, including from Canada, to move across Europe, to the destination of their operations. Thanks to financing from the common EU budget (1.5-billion EUR/US$1.77-billion), the Military Mobility infrastructure will now be upgraded across the continent. Additionally, legal and administrative procedures required to move troops and hazardous goods across Europe are also being revised and streamlined in hopes of facilitating these movements. The third initiative is the European Defence Fund (budget of 7-billion EUR/US$8.84-billion), which aims to provide financial incentives for a better co-operation among stakeholders in the European defence industry. What is important to note is that this mechanism will also be open to participation from third countries under specific conditions. It will certainly be of interest to the Canadian defence industry, as Canadian companies with subsidiaries in Europe will be able to benefit from EU-funds for research and development when joining co-operation projects with other European companies. Finally, on the conceptual side, the EU is currently developing the Strategic Compass, a concise document outlining the general policy guidance, future CSDP priorities, and needed capabilities, starting with agreeing on a common EU threat assessment. In conclusion, a more assertive, strategically autonomous EU will only benefit and strengthen transatlantic relations. Our transatlantic allies, Canada and the U.S., should not be concerned about a more assertive EU. Should the term “strategic autonomy” be better explained by European leaders? Probably. But it is clear that the EU’s goal is to improve complementarity with NATO without creating any duplications or competition. Consequently, in a world of changing global political structures and great power competition—which will not disappear with a Biden administration in Washington—our Canadian partners can count on the EU as a reliable and capable ally on the other side of the Atlantic. Brig.-Gen. Fritz Urbach is the EU Defence Attaché in Canada and the United States of America. The Hill Times